

Analysis of the pure logic of necessitation and its extensions

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What is The Pure Logic of Necessitation N?

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N is obtained from K by removing the K axiom

- or from the classical propositional logic by adding the necessitation rule ($\frac{\varphi}{\Box\varphi}$)

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It is a non-normal modal logic

- without congruence! ($\frac{\varphi \leftrightarrow \psi}{\Box\varphi \leftrightarrow \Box\psi}$)
- so it doesn't have a neighborhood semantics
- instead, it has a Kripke-like semantics

The rationale of \mathbf{N} (1)

Fitting et al. (1992) read $\Box\varphi$ in \mathbf{N} as “ φ is already derived”

- We cannot say ψ is *already* derived even if φ and $\varphi \rightarrow \psi$ have been derived!
- This justifies the lack of the K axiom: $\Box\varphi \wedge \Box(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \rightarrow \Box\psi$
- They used \mathbf{N} to analyze non-monotonic reasoning

The rationale of \mathbf{N} (2)

Kurahashi (2024) considered \Box in \mathbf{N} the simplest notion of provability, in terms of provability logic

- The most fundamental property of provability should be: “if something is proved, then it is provable”
- This justifies the presence of the necessitation rule: $\frac{\varphi}{\Box\varphi}$
- He identified that \mathbf{N} is exactly the provability logic of all provability predicates

The Kripke-like semantics for \mathbf{N}

Without the \mathbf{K} axiom, distinct \Box -formulas are hardly related

➔ The truth of $\Box\varphi$ must rely on its own accessibility relation

Definition (Fitting et al. (1992))

- Let \mathcal{L}_{\Box} be the set of all modal formulas $(\perp, \wedge, \vee, \rightarrow, \Box)$
- An \mathbf{N} -frame consists of the set of worlds W , and an accessibility relation \prec_{φ} over W , for each $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_{\Box}$
- An \mathbf{N} -model consists of an \mathbf{N} -frame and a valuation \Vdash , where the truth of $\Box\varphi$ is determined only by \prec_{φ} :

$$w \Vdash \Box\varphi :\iff \forall w' \in W (w \prec_{\varphi} w' \Rightarrow w' \Vdash \varphi)$$

Almost the same as Kripke semantics, with a twist on accessibility

Basic properties of \mathbf{N}

Theorem (Fitting et al. (1992))

\mathbf{N} has the finite frame property (FFP) w.r.t. all \mathbf{N} -frames

Proof.

Routine, by constructing a finite model of \mathbf{N} . □

Proposition

\mathbf{N} is not locally tabular

Proof.

We have an infinite sequence of provably distinct formulas:

$$\Box p, \Box \neg \neg p, \Box \neg^4 p, \Box \neg^6 p, \dots$$

□

Extending \mathbf{N} with an Axiom

$$\Box^n \varphi \rightarrow \Box^m \varphi$$

Several extensions of \mathbf{N}

Kurahashi considered several extensions that have a direct application in provability logic:

Theorem (Kurahashi (2024))

- $\mathbf{N4} := \mathbf{N} + \Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$ has FFP w.r.t. transitive \mathbf{N} -frames:

$$x \prec_{\Box\varphi} y \ \& \ y \prec_{\varphi} z \implies x \prec_{\varphi} z$$

- $\mathbf{NR} := \mathbf{N} + \frac{\neg\varphi}{\neg\Box\varphi}$ has FFP w.r.t. serial \mathbf{N} -frames:

$$\exists y (x \prec_{\varphi} y)$$

Like these, we can think of various \mathbf{N} counterparts of normal modal logics, with similar frame conditions!

$\text{Acc}_{m,n}$, the generalized transitivity axiom

Definition

- $x \prec_{\varphi}^k y$: “ x can see y in k steps w.r.t. φ ”
$$x \prec_{\Box^{k-1}\varphi} w_{k-1} \prec_{\Box^{k-2}\varphi} w_{k-2} \cdots w_2 \prec_{\Box\varphi} w_1 \prec_{\varphi} y$$
- (m, n) -accessibility: $x \prec_{\varphi}^m y \implies x \prec_{\varphi}^n y$
- $\text{Acc}_{m,n} := \Box^n \varphi \rightarrow \Box^m \varphi$

Here, transitivity is just $(2, 1)$ -accessibility, and the axiom $\Box\varphi \rightarrow \Box\Box\varphi$ is exactly $\text{Acc}_{2,1}$. Now one may wonder:

Problem

Does $\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ have FFP w.r.t. (m, n) -accessible \mathbf{N} -frames?

Incompleteness of $\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$

It turns out $\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ is not complete for some $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$:

Proposition

For $n \geq 2$, (1) $\neg \Box^{n+1} \perp$ is valid in all $(0, n)$ -accessible \mathbf{N} -frames, but (2) $\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{0,n} \not\vdash \neg \Box^{n+1} \perp$

Proof.

(1) Easy. (2) One can actually construct an \mathbf{N} -model where $\text{Acc}_{0,n}$ is valid but $\neg \Box^{n+1} \perp$ is not. □

\mathbf{N} -models allow more subtle construction of countermodels as the accessibility relation \prec_φ can be tweaked for each φ !

An additional rule to the rescue

Here, $\neg\Box^n\perp$ is provable in $\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{0,n}$ but $\neg\Box^{n+1}\perp$ is not

➡ adding the following rule would recover completeness:

$$\frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi}$$

Proposition

This rule is admissible in every normal modal logic

Corollary

$$\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{m,n} \subseteq \mathbf{N} + \frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi} + \text{Acc}_{m,n} \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$$

The finite frame property of $\mathbf{N} + \frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi} + \mathbf{Acc}_{m,n}$

Definition

$\mathbf{NA}_{m,n} := \mathbf{N} + \mathbf{Acc}_{m,n}$, and $\mathbf{N}^+ \mathbf{A}_{m,n} := \mathbf{N} + \frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi} + \mathbf{Acc}_{m,n}$

Theorem (K. & S.)

$\mathbf{N}^+ \mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ has FFP w.r.t. (m, n) -accessible \mathbf{N} -frames

Proof.

We carefully construct a finite (m, n) -accessible countermodel for a non-theorem of $\mathbf{N}^+ \mathbf{A}_{m,n}$. We note that the presence of $\frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi}$ indeed contributes to the construction. \square

Interpolation properties in $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ (1)

The rule $\frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi}$ seems to be only relevant when we consider the completeness theory w.r.t. the Kripke-like semantics.

The interpolation theorems hold with or without the rule:

Proposition

Both $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ have cut-admissible sequent calculi

Corollary

Both $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ enjoy CIP and LIP

Proof.

Just Use Maehara's MethodTM



Interpolation properties in $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ (2)

We obtained an even stronger result:

Theorem

Both $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ enjoy ULIP

Proof.

We embed both logics to the classical propositional logic \mathbf{Cl} , and reduce the problem to ULIP of \mathbf{Cl} , which is known. \square

Here, ULIP (uniform Lyndon —) is a strengthening of both UIP and LIP. See Kurahashi (2020) for details.

Bonus: a general method for proving ULIP

We also developed a general method for proving ULIP:

Theorem (S.)

For any logics $L \subseteq M$, if there is an embedding of M into L with certain properties, and L has ULIP, then so does M

Example

By the double negation embedding, ULIP of the intuitionistic propositional logic **Int** implies ULIP of **Cl**.

No deep dive today. See Sato (2025) for details!

The Showdown (vs. $K + \Box^n \varphi \rightarrow \Box^m \varphi$)

The showdown

Recall that:

$$\mathbf{N}\mathbf{A}_{m,n} \subseteq \mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n} \subseteq \mathbf{K} + \mathbf{Acc}_{m,n}$$

We shall compare the following properties of the above logics, which would highlight intriguing differences between them:

- Completeness
- The finite frame property
- The interpolation properties (CIP, LIP, UIP, ULIP)

Completeness: the hidden gems?

There is a classic result by Lemmon & Scott that $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ is complete for every $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$

So it is interesting that $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ is incomplete for some cases, and needs an extra rule $\frac{\neg\Box\varphi}{\neg\Box\Box\varphi}$ to fix it

- This rule is admissible in most logics, but seems to be very important for any logic with the necessitation rule

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Open Problem

Is there any other rule that is admissible in normal modal logics, but is essential for completeness of some logic extending \mathbf{N} ?

The finite frame property: why so hard?

FFP of $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ has been left unsolved* for decades, especially when $m < n$. Zakharyashev (1997) referred to it as “one of the major challenges in completeness theory”

On the other hand, FFP of $\mathbf{N}^+ \mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ is obtained, although not easily, by a direct construction of a finite countermodel!

*the cases when $m \geq 0$, $n = 1$ are solved by Gabbay (1972)

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Open Problem

Why is FFP of $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ so hard to prove? Is there some logic between $\mathbf{N}^+ \mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ with the same difficulty?

*the cases when $m \geq 0$, $n = 1$ are solved by Gabbay (1972)

Interpolation properties: the \mathbf{K} axiom to blame?

It is known that $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{m,n}$ does not, in general, enjoy all of CIP, LIP, UIP, and ULIP:

- Bílková (2007) proved that $\mathbf{K4} = \mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{2,1}$ lacks UIP
- Marx (1995) proved that $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{1,2}$ lacks even CIP

However, for any m, n , $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ enjoy all of them!

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However, for any m, n , $\mathbf{NA}_{m,n}$ and $\mathbf{N}^+\mathbf{A}_{m,n}$ enjoy all of them!

Open Problem

To what extent the presence of the \mathbf{K} axiom is *harmful* for a logic in terms of interpolation properties?

- Is there a logic between $\mathbf{N4}$ and $\mathbf{K4}$ that lacks UIP?
- Is there a logic between $\mathbf{N} + \text{Acc}_{1,2}$ and $\mathbf{K} + \text{Acc}_{1,2}$ that lacks CIP?

Thanks!

That's all!


The slides are available online, with the links to our papers:

cannorin.net/math/lc2025.pdf



Bonus: the Kripke game!

Daily Challenge: 00:33:18 until the next game.



Guess! (♡1)

Enter modal formula

Check! (♡1)

YOU WIN!



$\Diamond(\Box p \rightarrow p)$

$\Box p \rightarrow p$

$\Diamond\Box\perp$



I made a Wordle-like game
where you guess the shape of a
Kripke frame, just with formulas.
Give it a try!

cannorin.net/kripke



Appendix & References

Why \Box is decreasing in a chain?

$$\begin{aligned}w_0 \Vdash \Box\Box\Box\varphi &\iff \forall w_1 (w_0 \prec_{\Box\Box\Box\varphi} w_1 \Rightarrow w_1 \Vdash \Box\Box\varphi) \\&\iff \forall w_1, w_2 (w_0 \prec_{\Box\Box\Box\varphi} w_1 \prec_{\Box\Box\varphi} w_2 \Rightarrow w_2 \Vdash \Box\varphi) \\&\iff \forall w_1, w_2, w_3 (w_0 \prec_{\Box\Box\Box\varphi} w_1 \prec_{\Box\Box\varphi} w_2 \prec_{\Box\varphi} w_3 \Rightarrow w_3 \Vdash \varphi)\end{aligned}$$

Definition

We write $x \prec_{\varphi}^k y$ to mean that there are $w_{k-1}, w_{k-2}, \dots, w_1$ s.t.:

$$x \prec_{\Box^{k-1}\varphi} w_{k-1} \prec_{\Box^{k-2}\varphi} w_{k-2} \cdots w_2 \prec_{\Box\varphi} w_1 \prec_{\varphi} y$$

Proposition

$$w \Vdash \Box^n \varphi \iff \forall w' (w \prec_{\varphi}^n w' \Rightarrow w' \Vdash \varphi)$$

Diamonds are hard to handle in \mathbf{N}

If we define \Diamond as $\neg\Box\neg\ldots$


- then: $w \Vdash \Diamond\varphi \iff \exists w' (w \prec_{\neg\varphi} w' \ \& \ w' \nVdash \neg\varphi)$
- here, the truth of $\Diamond\varphi$ is determined by $\prec_{\neg\varphi}$
- so \Box and \Diamond are hardly related!

If we add \Diamond as a primitive...

- then: $w \Vdash \Diamond\varphi \iff \exists w' (w \prec_{\varphi} w' \ \& \ w' \Vdash \varphi)$
- so \Box and \Diamond are not dual!
- may be a good approach than the above?

Not investigated much (yet), but the situation here looks similar to that of intuitionistic modal logics

The construction of the falsifying model for $\neg \Box^{n+1} \perp$



Let $n \geq 2$, then consider the above frame and a valuation that every propositional variable is true in both x and y , then we can define the dashed relation so that $x \prec_{\varphi} y$ if and only if $\varphi = \Box^{n-1} \psi$ and $x \not\models \psi$

Now one can show that $\text{Acc}_{0,n} = \Box^n \varphi \rightarrow \varphi$ is valid in the model but $x \not\models \neg \Box^{n+1} \perp$, so $\mathbf{NA}_{0,n} \not\models \neg \Box^{n+1} \perp$ by soundness

The propositionalization method (1/2)

Propositionalization is a method that can be used to reduce ULIP of logic to that of a weaker one. It proceeds like this:

Given a logic X , let \mathcal{L}_X designate the language of X .

Consider logics L and M s.t. $\mathcal{L}_L \subseteq \mathcal{L}_M$ and $L \subseteq M$.

Definition

Let L' be the same logic as L , but its propositional variables extended by adding a fresh one p_φ for every $\varphi \in \mathcal{L}_M$.

Definition

Let $\sigma : \mathcal{L}'_L \rightarrow \mathcal{L}_M$ be the substitution that replaces every p_φ with φ . It is easy to see that $L' \vdash \rho$ implies $M \vdash \sigma(\rho)$ for any $\rho \in \mathcal{L}'_L$.

The propositionalization method (2/2)

Definition

A pair of translations $\sharp, \flat : \mathcal{L}_M \rightarrow \mathcal{L}'_L$ is called a propositionalization of M into L if the following are met:

1. $M \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \psi$ implies $L' \vdash \varphi^\flat \rightarrow \psi^\sharp$;
2. $M \vdash \sigma(\varphi^\sharp) \rightarrow \varphi$ and $M \vdash \varphi \rightarrow \sigma(\varphi^\flat)$;
3. For $(\bullet, \circ) \in \{(+, -), (-, +)\}$ and $\natural \in \{\sharp, \flat\}$,
 $p \in v^\bullet(\varphi^\natural)$ implies $p \in v^\bullet(\varphi)$, and $p_\psi \in v^\bullet(\varphi^\natural)$ implies both $v^\bullet(\psi) \subseteq v^\bullet(\varphi)$ and $v^\circ(\psi) \subseteq v^\circ(\varphi)$.

Theorem (S.)

If L has ULIP, and there is a propositionalization of M into L , then M also has ULIP.

References

This talk is based on the papers indicated by ★.

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Omori and Skurt rediscovered the same logic as \mathbf{N} , namely \mathbf{M}^+ in their paper. They also gave a non-deterministic many-valued semantics for \mathbf{N} .